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The Rescue of Jerusalem: a view from the Nile valley 
 
Aidan Dodson 
University of Bristol 
 
The fundamental thesis of The Rescue of Jerusalem is that it was the 
intervention of an Egyptian-Kushite army that proved decisive in causing the 
Assyrian king Sennacherib to lift his siege of Jerusalem in 701 BC and 
return east. This is argued on the basis of the interpretation of data 
provided by the Old Testament and Assyrian records, rather than anything 
from Egypt or Nubia – for the very good reason that no material has yet been 
found there that can be associated with that campaign. The only possible 
exception has been a pair of texts (on stelae from the site of Kawa in Nubia 
– fig. 1) in which the later-king Taharqo looks back on a time in his 
princely years when he came north “as a youth” from Kush to Egypt with a 
force of recruits to join King Shabatako.1 While some have suggested that 
this was part of preparations for the 701 campaign, there is nothing in the 
text itself to link the text with the events in question and, as will be 
discussed below, it now seems that it refers to an occasion at least a 
decade prior to 701.[INSERT FIG. 1 NEAR HERE] 
 However, even if it had referred to preparations for the 701 campaign, it 
would have said nothing about the impact and effectiveness of the force once 
it arrived in Palestine, making it very difficult for an Egyptologist to 
take an informed view of the role that the Egyptian-Kushite force played. 
All that one can do is to consider the credibility of the implications of 
some of Rescue’s arguments as far as Egypt and Kush are concerned. 
 Most modern commentators have taken a negative view of the effectiveness 
of the Egyptian-Kushite forces, with many quoted in Chapter 14 of Rescue, 
However, in no case are such comments based on any unequivocal data; indeed, 
in most cases they seem ultimately to be a (conscious or otherwise) echoing 
of an implicitly racist “received wisdom” originating in the late 19th 
century AD, through whose lens what little ancient material with any bearing 
 
1 Kawa Stela IV (Khartoum, Sudan National Museum 2678), l. 7–9, V 
(Copenhagen, Ny Carlsberg Glyptotek ÆIN 1712), l.13–14 (T. Eide, T. Hägg, R. 
Holton-Pierce and L. Török [eds], Fontes Historiae Nubiorum: textual sources 
for the history of the Middle Nile region between the eighth century BC and 
the sixth century AD, I [Bergen: Klassisk institutt, Universitetet i Bergen, 
1994], 139, 153). For this interpretation, see (e.g.) K.A. Kitchen, The 
Third Intermediate Period (1100–650 B.C.), 3rd edition (Warmister: Aris & 




on the events is viewed (cf. Rescue, Chapter 19). In contrast, Rescue, 
suggests that the 25th Dynasty possessed “one of the strongest, probably the 
strongest — army in Egypt for many centuries” (p. 74), “[p]ossibly ... even 
the strongest army in the entire history of Egypt” (p. 323 n.85). 
 Given that nothing is known about the numbers or composition of the 
Egyptian-Kushite army, such positive views are just as lacking in 
contemporary objective evidence as the negative assessments. Indeed, there 
is potentially a danger of circular reasoning: if the Egyptian-Kushite army 
had defeated the hitherto-invincible Assyrians, it must therefore have been 
a force of exceptional quality. In any case, it seems excessive to suggest 
that it could have exceeded the strength of the Egyptian armies of the 18th 
Dynasty, which had been built up through decades of wide-ranging warfare and 
were supported by an economy that was probably the strongest ever possessed 
by Egypt – underpinned by the natural resources (especially gold) of Kush 
(then an integral province of Egypt), which had also provided important 
elements of the imperial army. 
 On the other hand, in comparison with the immediately preceding centuries 
(since the late 12th century BC), Egypt and Kush were in 701 once again 
under a single overlord (although the local kinglets of the preceding 
century still existed), and thus likely to be a more efficient entity – with 
the Nubian goldfields once more able to directly underpin the economy and 
allow the diversion of more resources to the military. Indeed, the civil 
wars that had plagued Egypt during the later 9th and 8th centuries may have 
provided a larger reservoir of Egyptians with military experience than had 
been the case at any time since the New Kingdom, with the possible exception 
of the brief flowering of Egyptian military power under Shoshenq I in the 
mid 10th century.2  
 The Kushites had also gained experience through Piankhy’s campaign into 
northern Egypt and his successor’s re-occupation of the same territory in 
the decades immediately preceding 701. The capabilities thus demonstrated 
doubtless built on the military activities that had allowed the Kingdom of 
Kush to expand out of its Upper Nubian heartland to such a degree that by 
the middle of the 8th century it embraced southern Egypt, including the 
Thebaid and the holy city of Thebes itself.3 
 
2 When Jerusalem has been on the receiving end of Egyptian aggression; for a 
recent discussion of Shoshenq I’s activities in Palestine, updating the 
picture noted in Rescue, see A. Dodson, Afterglow of Empire: Egypt from the 
fall of the New Kingdom to the Saite Renaissance (Cairo: American University 
in Cairo Press, 2012), 87–95. 




 Taking both national elements together with an invigorated combined 
economy, there seems no reason to doubt that the Nile Valley could indeed 
have put together a more credible army than had been the case for a long 
time. Thus, while to suggest that the Egyptian-Kushite forces deployed in 
701 was the ‘strongest army in the entire history of Egypt’ has to be 
dismissed as unjustifiable hyperbole, there is no reason to doubt that it 
could have been well-resourced, experienced and, if well-led, effective on 
the battlefield – even against the Assyrians. It should also be noted that 
an Egyptian-Kushite army was certainly able to repulse an Assyrian invasion 
of Egypt in 674, although subsequently defeated in 671 (but still able to 
regain control prior to a final Assyrian take-over in 664). It is also 
possible that the failure of Assyria to threaten Egypt for some two decades 
after 701 could have been a function of respect for Egyptian-Kushite 
military prowess displayed that year. 
  In this connection it is perhaps worth noting that by then it had been 
some time since the Assyrian army had come up against a true nation-state, 
with an extensive hinterland, rather than the much smaller, city-centred, 
polities of Syria-Palestine. The Egyptian-Kushite forces would also have had 
much shorter supply-lines than the Assyrians, now operating some 600 miles 
from their homeland, rather than the 150 miles that separated their 
opponents from the Nile delta.  
 The Old Testament states that the Egyptian-Kushite forces were led by 
“Tirhakah, King of Kush” – clearly the Taharqo who ruled from 690 to 664. As 
the campaign against Jerusalem is securely dated by Assyrian data to 701, 
this statement has led to various interpretations, including suggestions 
that there might have been a second campaign, unattested from the 
Assyrian/Biblical side, or that “Tirhakah”, as the best-known Kushite king, 
was cited in error for the actual king ruling in 701. However, the general 
view has been for some time that “King of Kush” is simply a gloss, 
highlighting that the individual involved, while simply an army commander in 
701, was the same man as the Taharqo who had gone on to become king; this 
still seems the best explanation. Nevertheless, many commentators have 
queried whether Taharqo was actually old enough to have exercised true 
operational control of the Egypto-Kushite army,4 Rescue following the view 
that he was only twenty years old at the time, with others making him even 
younger. 
 It is important to note that the age of Taharqo in 701 is a direct 
function of broader reconstructions of the history of the Kushite royal 
family. This accordingly brings us to a point where we need to switch focus 
 




to this particular topic, and explore the implications of a radical revision 
of the history of the 25th Dynasty that has been developing since 2013, and 
which has important consequences for the dynamics of the events of 701 and 
the immediately preceding decade. 
 It is worth underlining that prior to the accession of Taharqo in 690 BC, 
no events in Egyptian history can be unequivocally fixed in terms of years 
BC. Taharqo’s accession date (and thus that of the death of his predecessor) 
is obtained by adding his unequivocal reign length5 to the accession-year of 
his successor Psamtik I – which is the first Egyptian point in time solidly 
linked into the known chronology of the broader ancient world.6 Before this, 
all dates depend on the view one takes of the range of variables that can 
interact to produce an estimated equivalent date-BC for a given Egyptian 
king’s regnal year. These variables can include even the relative placement 
of individuals and events, since there are many cases where the extant data 
is equivocal in the extreme and can be legitimately read in contradictory 
ways. Accordingly, scholars can only formulate “working hypotheses” as to 
such matters, although these may, through the passage of time and lack of 
challenge become regarded, especially by non-specialists in the minutiae of 
Egyptian historiography, as “facts”, in spite of the lack of any definitive 
proof. As there are no references in Egyptian sources to the events of 701, 
the identification of who was ruling in the Nile Valley at that time is 
accordingly entirely dependent on the “working hypothesis” one adopts for 
the decades preceding Taharqo’s accession (fig. 2). [INSERT FIG.2 NEAR HERE] 
 In Rescue, the hypothesis adopted is that 701 fell during a 6-year 
coregency between Shabako and his eventual successor Shabatako. This order 
of succession enshrines an assumption, going back to the dawn of modern 
Egyptology, that these royal names were the respective hieroglyphic 
prototypes of the Greek forms “Sabacon” and “Sebichos”, placed in that order 
by the 3rd century BC historian Manetho. The latter records that “Sabacon” 
defeated the Saite (24th Dynasty) king “Bocchoris” (Bakenrenef), an event 
which marked the unification of Egypt and Kush, and has been generally dated 
on the basis of broader Egyptian chronological calculations to the mid-710s 
(“c. 712” in Rescue). This is usually placed in Shabako’s second year (as 
 
5 Calculated from the lifespan of sacred bull Apis XXXVII, which died in Year 
20 of Psamtik I at the age 21 years, 2 months and seven days, and had been 
born in Year 26 of King Taharqo. 
6 L. Depuydt, “Saite and Persian Egypt, 664 BC–332 BC (Dyns. 26–31, 
Psammetichus I to Alexander’s Conquest of Egypt),” in E. Hornung, 
R. Krauss and D. Warburton (eds), Ancient Egyptian Chronology, HdO 83 




both Year 6 of Bakenrenef and a year reported to Shabako’s Year 2 are 
usually – but perhaps not correctly – attributed to the same burial in the 
Serapeum at Saqqara).7 Since Shabako is known from contemporary texts to have 
reigned for a minimum of fifteen years, his reign would run down to the end 
of the eighth century (i.e. just before or just after 701).  
 On this basis, the succession of Shabatako was long placed at this point, 
giving him around a decade of reign (albeit unattested in contemporary 
records beyond his Year 3) before Taharqo’s guaranteed accession in 690. 
However, the 1999 publication of an April 706-dated text of Sargon II of 
Assyria at Tang-i Var in Iran, which recorded that “Shapataku, ruler of the 
land of Meluḫḫa (Kush)” had sent the fugitive ruler of Ashdod, Iamani, in 
chains to the Assyrian king, upset this scheme. Since “Shapataku” could 
hardly be other than Shabatako, the beginning of his reign would be pushed 
back to 707 at the latest. A Shabako-to-Shabatako succession in or before 
706 would mean that Shabako’s minimum fifteen-year reign would begin in 722 
at the latest – i.e. around a decade earlier than is usually allowed.  
 Given the direct and indirect consequences of such a change on the history 
of the 8th century (see further, below), many scholars sought to avoid it by 
arguing that the text actually indicated that in 706 Shabako and Shabatako 
were ruling together, either as formal coregents8 or with the latter as some 
form of “viceroy”, ruling Kush while Shabako was in Egypt.9 Both options 
allowed the basic chronological structure to remain undisturbed, with the 
“coregency” version followed in Rescue. 
 Unfortunately, both of these “explanations” lack any independent 
verification and are replete with problems. Taking the second first, we have 
no evidence for any office of the kind implied by the “viceroy” theory, 
leaving aside the question of how/why an Assyrian king would be dealing with 
a subordinate of Shabako’s, whose territory was separated from his by the 
Kingdom of Egypt, rather than Shabako himself, actually present in said 
 
7 The stela of Shabako is only described verbally in A. Mariette, Le Sérapeum 
de Memphis, I (Paris: Vieweg, 1882), 184, and appears now to be lost; its 
date and name of the dedicated king cannot be verified. It may be noted that 
Mariette also notes a fragment bearing the remains of the prenomen of 
Shabatako in the same room as contained the ‘Shabako’ stela. 
8 E.g. D.B. Redford, as cited in Rescue, 323 n.87.  
9 As argued by Kitchen, “The Third Intermediate Period in Egypt: an overview 
of fact and fiction”, in The Libyan Period in Egypt: historical and cultural 
studies into the 21st –24th Dynasties – Proceedings of a conference at Leiden 






 As for the question of a formal coregency, there survives no material with 
double dates of Shabako and Shabatako, nor any representations of them 
acting together.11 It should also be emphasised that, contrary to the 
impression generally given by Egyptologists, coregency (whereby a king 
associated his heir with him on the throne, with full kingly titles, and in 
some cases his own regnal years) was by no means a provably widely-used 
institution.  
 Although proposed for various pairings of kings in modern histories of 
ancient Egypt, on closer inspection most alleged cases of coregency turn out 
to ultimately be means of resolving apparent chronological conundra of the 
kind presented by the Tang-i Var evidence, rather than contemporary data 
left behind by the putative co-rulers – i.e. double-dating of texts, or 
representations of the protagonists acting together (rather than simply 
appearing separately on a wall or other monument).12 During the 12th Dynasty 
(20th to 18th centuries BC), there is such evidence in the form of double-
dates (although even these have been queried by some scholars). However, 
during the New Kingdom (16th to 11th centuries), there is actually only one 
wholly unequivocal example of a coregency, involving a female (Hatshepsut) 
acting alongside a male (Thutmose III), whom she had no normal prospect of 
succeeding (and whose regnal years she shared). There are also two further 
coregencies that seem highly likely, but both of these are also anomalous, 
each involving a co-ruler (one a female) apparently not in the direct line 
of succession, nor destined for ultimate independent rule (Smenkhkare and 
Neferneferuaten).13 All other putative examples are based on subjective 
 
10 Cf. K. Jansen-Winkeln, “The Third Intermediate Period,” in Hornung, Krauss 
and Warburton (eds), Ancient Egyptian Chronology, 258–59, pace Kitchen’s 
protestations to the contrary (Libyan Period in Egypt, 163–64). 
11 Turin stela 1467, showing the two kings together, is undoubtedly a forgery 
(R. Morkot and S. Quirke, “Inventing the 25th Dynasty: Turin stela 1467 and 
the construction of history,” in C.-B. Arnst, I. Hafemann and A. Lohwasser 
(eds), Begegnungen: Antike Kulturen im Niltal. Festgabe für Erika 
Endesfelder, Karl-Heinz Priese, Walter Friedrich Reinecke, Steffen Wenig 
[Leipzig: Wodtke und Stegbaue, 2001], 349–63). 
12 For a detailed discussion, see Dodson, “The Coregency Conundrum”, Kmt 25/2 
(2014), 28–35. 
13 For a discussion of these individuals and their likely (albeit 
controversial) status, see Dodson, Amarna Sunset: Nefertiti, Tutankhamun, 
Ay, Horemheb and the Egyptian Counter-Reformation (Cairo: American 




analysis of material that is all ultimately equivocal, or possibly even 
erroneous (e.g. a potentially miswritten date in the case of the proposed 
coregency between Thutmose III and Amenhotep II). 
 During the period leading up to Kushite rule, the only known true co-
regency (i.e. an anticipatory generational transition, not a case of kings 
of rival lines ruling in parallel, as was a feature of much of the Third 
Intermediate Period) is that between Osorkon III and Takelot III, attested 
by a clear father-son double-date (the only such double-date since the 
Middle Kingdom!). In contextualising this, one should note that at the time 
of this unique double-date, Osorkon III was in extreme old age, the 
coregency having been instituted after Osorkon had held senior positions for 
some six-and-a-half decades, and was thus probably a ‘non-standard’ 
arrangement driven by the practical circumstance of the elder king’s 
senility, rather than supporting the idea that coregency was in any way a 
‘normal’ matter. 
 On the basis of the foregoing, there should be a prima facie assumption 
against assuming the existence of a coregency in the absence of 
representations of rulers acting together or unequivocal double-dates, no 
matter how tempting the chronological and other drivers might be. Given that 
this alleged coregency of Shabako and Shabatako was only ever posited to 
“save” broader chronological assumptions, in the wake of the “Tang-i Var 
conundrum”, it is methodologically unsound to make it the key underpinning 
of a working hypothesis for the 8th/7th century transition. 
 This seemingly left the unpalatable option of pushing Shabako’s accession 
back to 722,14 with donation stelae from the Delta showing that he was 
recognized in that region as early as his Years 2 through 6 (*720–*716). 
But, in spite of this, when Sargon II menaced Egypt in 716, it was not 
Shabako, but “Shilkanni, king of Egypt” (generally agreed to be Osorkon IV 
of Tanis) who dealt with the Assyrian, and appeased him through a gift of 
horses. Although it is clear that local kings still continued to exist 
around Egypt until the end of the reign of Taharqo, the absence of Shabako 
from an affair of such importance could be seen as very odd. 
 However, all of this depended on Shabako being Shabatako’s predecessor, 
and in 2013 there appeared a new study that (inter alia) proposed the 
reversal of the order of the two reigns,15 with further papers seconding the 
 
14 For a reconstruction of the period on this basis, see Dodson, Afterglow, 
139–68. 
15 M. Bányai, “Ein Vorschlag zur Chronologie der 25. Dynastie in Ägypten,” 
Journal of Egyptian History 6 (2013), 46–129; “Die Reihenfolge der 




new view appearing the following years.16 All recognized that neither Greek 
name in Manetho’s chronicle, “Sabacon” nor “Sebichos”, contained anything 
that supported the conventional order,17 and explored the implications of 
switching the two kings around. 
 Regarding overall chronology, making Shabako the later of the two kings 
would make his known fifteen regnal years run from Taharqo’s accession in 
690 to 705. Not only would this square with the fourteen years given to 
“Sebichos” in Africanus’ version of Manetho,18 but would place the transition 
between the re-ordered reigns after 706, leaving no problem with taking 
Shabatako’s appearance in the Tang-i Var inscription in that year as being 
an independent monarch. No regnal year higher than the third is known for 
Shabatako, but giving him the eight years of Africanus’ version of Manetho 
would place his accession around 713, fitting perfectly with the 
conventional dating for the transition between Piankhy and his successor. 
 Looking at other material from the period, the reversal of Shabako and 
Shabatako also has positive results. First, the substructure of Shabatako’s 
pyramid at El-Kurru is of a “cut and cover” type found only among the 
earliest Kushite royal tombs, including that of Piankhy, and has no trace of 
decoration. In contrast, Shabako’s tomb has a tunnelled substructure – a 
type found in all later Kushite royal tombs – with traces of mythological 
texts, also as found in later royal tombs.19 Thus, while the conventional 
 
should be noted that these papers make other proposals for the 
reconfiguration of the 25th Dynasty beyond simply reversing the order of 
Shabatako and Shabatako that are not consistent with the implications of the 
reversal as developed below. 
16 F. Payraudeau, “Retour sur la succession Shabako-Shabatako”, NeHeT 1 
(2014), 115–27; G.P.F. Broekman, “The order of succession between Shabaka 
and Shabataka; A different view on the chronology of the Twenty-fifth 
Dynasty,” Göttinger Miszellen 245 (2015), 17–31; the following paragraphs 
summarize key points raised in these papers. J. Pope, writing in the present 
volume, pp. ***–**, also takes a supportive position vis å vis this proposed 
reconfiguration. 
17 Indeed, Broekman, Göttinger Miszellen 245, 20 n.18, wondered whether the 
“n” at the end of the first name might derive from a misreading of a poorly-
written Egyptian t3-sign as an n (both are horizontal signs), and thus could 
support “Sabakon” actually concealing the name Shabatako. 
18 Generally regarded as the least inaccurate of the surviving epitomes of 
Manetho’s now-lost original work. 
19 For Kushite royal tombs, see Dodson, The Royal Tombs of Ancient Egypt 




ordering of the kings requires an unexpected architectural regression under 
Shabatako, the reversal of the kings’ order allows a more natural 
architectural progression to be observed. 
 Moving to epigraphic matters, Shabatako is not mentioned on the statue of 
Shabako’s son, the high priest of Amun Horemakhet (fig. 3), although Shabako 
himself, Taharqo and Tanutamun are all included as kings whom Horemakhet 
served: unless Shabatako was in some way disgraced (for which there is no 
evidence whatsoever), this absence is very odd. Likewise, at the Small 
Temple at Medinet Habu, the pylon added during the 25th Dynasty (fig. 4) 
bears the names of Shabako and Taharqo only, suggesting that decoration 
began under Shabako and was continued under Taharqo: there is no indication 
of any hiatus under any intervening reign of Shabatako. [INSERT FIGS. 3 & 4 
NEAR HERE] 
 A further piece of evidence is provided by the texts marking the annual 
height of the Nile inundation at Karnak, which are arranged in such a way 
that those of Shabatako would appear to have been carved before those of 
Shabako. Also at Karnak, in the temple of Osiris-Heqadjet (fig. 5), the 
God’s Wife of Amun Shepenwepet I (daughter of Osorkon III) appears in a 
portion of the temple decorated under Shabatako, as does her successor, 
Amenirdis I. Under the normal ordering of kings, Shepenwepet I would be 
long-dead in these scenes, as Amenirdis I is known to have succeeded her as 
God’s Wife by Year 12 of Shabako,20 i.e. at least three years before 
Shabatako’s assumed accession. If, on the other hand, Shabatako were the 
earlier king, Shepenwepet I would have been the incumbent God’s Wife at his 
accession, with the probability that the decoration of the temple was 
underway at the time of Shepenwepet’s replacement by the (Kushite) Amenirdis 
I,21 explaining both ladies’ presence there.[INSERT FIG.5 NEAR HERE] 
 Reversing the order of Shabako and Shabatako can thus be seen to resolve a 
range of issues, and while objections can raised, none can be regarded as 
decisive.22 Indeed, addressing them has in many cases actually produced 
further evidence supporting the revision. 
 In terms of Egypto-Assyrian relations, the new configuration leaves 
 
20 Graffito in the Wadi Hammamat. 
21 The “Year 12” date is purely a terminus ante quem, and says nothing about 
when the transition between Shepenwepet I and Amenirdis I took place. Since 
Shepenwepet I had been in office since around 790, and was probably a mature 
woman at the time, her death around 710 under a re-ordered Shabatako is far 
more credible than it occurring a decade later under a conventionally-
ordered Shabako.  




Shilkanni/Osorkon IV’s gift of horses in 716 well before the Kushite return 
to northern Egypt. The arrival of Iamani in the Nile Valley would coincide 
closely with Shabatako succeeding Piankhy23 as the new king of Kush, when 
Kushite direct control extended no further north than the Thebaid.24 
 Iamani’s arrival may have provided a catalyst for the new king to reverse 
Piankhy’s decade-old apparent policy of maintaining no more than a distant 
suzerain relationship with the rulers of Egypt north of the Thebaid, under 
which relations with Asiatic powers had been implicitly left in the hands of 
these monarchs (e.g. Osorkon IV in 716). Given Assyrian expansionism, and 
the presence of a Palestinan fugitive at his court, Shabatako may have taken 
the view that the security of the Nile Valley was best secured by 
consolidating his power in the far north. It is known that Shabatako was 
physically in Thebes in his Year 3 and it may be that, having been formally 
crowned there as King of Egypt, he moved north, dethroned Bakenrenef and 
became the supreme ruler of the full length of a now-united kingdom of Egypt 
and Kush.25  
 This new status is likely to have been the occasion for Shabatako’s change 
of Horus-name from “Strong-bull-appearing-in-Thebes” (citing part of the 
domain he had inherited from Piankhy, and perhaps even the latter’s 
predecessor, Kashta), which he was using in Year 3, to the non-geographic 
“Enduring-of-appearances” that is found on undated, but probably later, 
monuments – including a statue found at Memphis and now in Cairo.26 Indeed, 
Shabatako’s original titulary is another point in favour of placing him 
before Shabako in the royal succession, as it follows the expansive minatory 
style of the kings of the imperial New Kingdom (and imitated by the far less 
powerful kings of the following Third Intermediate Period). In contrast, a 
simple archaising style that had started to be adopted during the middle of 
the eighth century by kings in Egypt-proper (e.g. by Shoshenq V of Tanis and 
Osorkon III27 of Thebes) would be the universal mode employed by Shabako, 
 
23 Probably as his son, given that Taharqo, definitely a son of Piankhy, 
refers to himself as one of Shabatako’s brothers in his Kawa stelae. 
24 Cf. Broekman’s comments on Assyrian references to Iamani’s flight 
(Göttinger Miszellen 245, 24–25). 
25 Although, as already noted, local dynasties, including some of kings, 
continued to exist in northern Egypt until the end of Kushite rule. 
26 CG 655 = JE 27852 (L. Borchardt, Statuen und Statuetten von Königen und 
Privatleuten im Museum von Kairo, Nr. 1–1294, III [Berlin: Reichsdruckerei, 
1930], 2, pl. 121.  
27 It should be noted that Rescue’s account of the internal affairs of Egypt 




Taharqo, Tanutamun, and the subsequent kings of Egypt and Kush for some 
centuries. Shabatako’s use of an “extended” Horus-name would thus be 
anomalous if he did indeed reign after Shabako. 
 On the basis of the reconfiguration of the reigns, Shabatako’s preparation 
for the defeat of Bakenrenef is likely to have been the occasion when the 
future king Taharqo went “as a twenty year old recruit ... with His Majesty 
to Lower Egypt”,28 rather than in connection with the events of 701, as has 
often been proposed.29 In this case, Taharqo’s age in 701 would be raised to 
something around thirty – a more credible age for an army commander-in-
chief, and dealing decisively with the issues noted on p. ***).  
 Another age-issue resolved by the reordering of Shabako and Shabatako 
concerns Tanwetamani, the son of Shabako and successor of Taharqo. On the 
conventional ordering, Tanwetamani would have come to the throne some forty 
years after his father’s death; under the reversal, the gap would only have 
been the two-and-a-half decades of Taharqo’s reign. 
 Shabako’s background in not wholly clear. He is usually confidently called 
a son of Piankhy’s predecessor, Kashta, on the basis of a now-lost 
inscription that is recorded as naming the God’s Wife Amunirdis I as “King’s 
Sister” of Shabako.30 However, in Egyptian “sister” can refer to a more 
generalised female relative (even a wife), so this cannot be regarded as 
definitive evidence.31 Manetho states that “Sabichos” was the son of 
“Sabakon”, and with the re-identification of these kings, it is possible 
that Shabako was actually Shabatako’s son, although it is perhaps more 
likely that he was a sibling – Shabako certainly married a daughter of 
Piankhy.32 
 
Kitchen’s Third Intermediate Period, is now obsolete regarding its 
localization of the 23rd Dynasty and definition of its constituent kings; 
for an updated discussion, see Dodson, Afterglow of Empire, 114–38. 
28 Kawa stela V, l. 16–17 (Eide et al. [eds], Fontes Historiae Nubiorum I, 
153). 
29 On the non-sequentiality of the Kawa narratives, cf. Broekman, GM 245, 28–
30. 
30 Other texts include cartouches of Amenirdis’s royal “brother”, but all 
have been erased and are unreadable. 
31 Cf. Broekman, Göttinger Miszellen 245, 30 
32 Against the idea of Shabako being a son of Shabatako is that Shabako would 
then be succeeded by his nephew (son of Piankhy) Taharqo, rather than by one 
of his sons (e.g. Horemakhet [p. ***, above] or the later king Tanwetamani). 
On the other hand, Kushite rules of succession remain obscure, and seem not 




 The shifting of the reign of Shabako to a span of 705–690 makes perhaps 
less likely arguments that the seal-impressions bearing his image found at 
Nineveh (fig. 6)33 [INSERT FIG. 6 NEAR HERE] should be dated prior to 701, 
and thus unrelated to that year’s events.34 However, the view that they 
derive from the sealing of some kind of peace-treaty, as espoused in Rescue, 
following many earlier authors, does not seem likely. There seems little 
doubt that the sealings derive from storage jars, the mud element matching 
the internal traces found on contemporary undoubted jar-closures,35 in spite 
of the objections in Rescue.36 On the other hand, the fact that these two 
examples bear both an Egyptian seal-impression and an Assyrian one suggests 
that whatever was once contained in the jar(s) was not a simple trade-item, 
the second impression implying some verification or approval of the contents 
by an Assyrian official present in Egypt at the time of packing.37  
 Accordingly, while the seal-impressions cannot be used to support the 
romantic idea of their being part of a physical peace agreement (which, to 
judge from other examples of ancient peace treaties, would have taken the 
form of an exchange of cuneiform tablets), they may well have formed part of 
a formal gift exchange that, given the key role played in the exchange of 
valuable goods in ancient diplomacy, might have accompanied an agreement 
between the two states. It should be noted that another fragment of Egyptian 
 
generally held by scholars that a king was succeeded first by his brothers, 
before shifting to the next generation: if Shabatako, Shabako and Taharqo 
were all brothers, this would work well, with the throne then going to 
Shabako’s son Tanwetamani (presumably in the absence of any surviving son of 
Shabatako). For a discussion of the underlying issues of Kushite succession 
rules, see R. Morkot, “Kingship and Kinship in the Empire of Kush,” in S. 
Wenig [ed.], Studien zum antiken Sudan: Akten der 7. Internationalen Tagung 
für meroitische Forschungen vom 14. bis 19. September 1992 in Gosen/bei 
Berlin [Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 1999], 188–94. 
33 Rescue, 149–50; now British Museum WA 84527 and WA 84884. 
34 Noted in Rescue, 352 n.5. 
35 See W.M.F. Petrie, Tanis II, Nebesheh (Am) and Defenneh (Tahpanhes) 
(London: Egypt Exploration Fund, 1888), 72, pl. xxxvi[4]. 
36 Rescue, 352 n.5, a statement apparently made without understanding the 
make-up of the sealing. Pope (this volume, ***) favors the idea that the 
marks derive from a cord closing a bag containing valuables. 
37 Pope (this volume, ***) puts forward the contrary view that the sealing 





seal-impression is known from Nineveh, giving the name “Menkheperre”.38 This 
was the prenomen of Thutmose III of the 15th century, the name of a Theban 
high priest of 11th century – and also a variant prenomen used by Piankhy. 
Given that Nineveh’s prominence dates from Neo-Assyrian times, the latter 
seems the more likely ascription, thus providing evidence for some kind of 
exchange between Assyria and Kush some years before 701. 
 Whether there was a formal treaty in the wake of the events of 701 is a 
problematic question in the absence of any direct evidence, e.g. cuneiform 
tablets recording such (of which many exist around the ancient Levant), or a 
copy on an Egyptian temple wall (as survives from the 13th century Egyptian-
Hittite treaty). One factor that might support such a thing is the fact that 
it was then over two decades before Assyria and Egypt once again came into 
conflict, following the deaths of both parties to a putative treaty 
(although, as noted above, p. ***, more practical issues of military balance 
might have been involved). However, any consideration of what such a treaty 
might have contained, as is set out in Rescue, pp. 150–54, can be no more 
than sheer speculation in the light of the lack of objective evidence, and 
Rescue’s suggestion there that it might have been a multilateral agreement 
lacks any supporting parallels. 
 What, then, can one usefully conclude, from the Egyptian/Nubian point of 
view, about the thesis put forward in Rescue, particularly in light of the 
highly probable revision of the Kushite royal succession? Starting with a 
negative, the reversal of the order of Shabako and Shabatako removes the 
possibility that Prince Taharqo’s journey with an army from Kush to Egypt 
might have been in preparation for the campaign of 701, thus deleting the 
one potential piece of Egyptian/Nubian data that could directly attest to 
it. On the other hand, the likely age of Taharqo in 701 is raised to around 
30, making his position as head of the Egyptian-Kushite forces far more 
credible. 
 As for the strength and capability of those forces is concerned, the union 
of Egypt and Kush restored the economic basis of the military power of the 
glory days of the New Kingdom, while the endemic warfare in the Nile Valley 
over the preceding decades may well have provided a more martial pool of 
 
38 British Museum WA 84526; cf. J. Pope, The Double Kingdom under Taharqo: 
Studies in the History of Kush and Egypt c. 690-664 BC (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 
2014), 11, n. 39, and A. Lohwasser, “Zu den Men-Cheper-Ra-Skarabäen der 25. 
Dynastie”, in J. Budka, R. Gundacker, Gabriele Pieke (eds), Florilegium 
Aegyptiacum: Eine wissenschaftliche Blütenlese von Schülern und Freunden für 
Helmut Satzinger zum 75. Geburtstag am 21. Jänner 2013 (Göttingen: Göttinger 




manpower that might otherwise have been the case. On this basis, and the 
favourable strategic position of their home territory relative to the 
Palestinian theatre of operations, there seems no prima facie reason to 
question the ability of Egyptian-Kushite forces to have given a good account 
of themselves against the Assyrians. Accordingly, Rescue’s proposal that it 
was the Egyptian-Kushite intervention that proved decisive in 701 seems a 
perfectly reasonable working hypothesis, even if not provable on the basis 
of extant data. 
 Regarding the dynamics behind the Egyptian-Kushite intervention, the 
revision of the royal succession clarifies the contrast between the policy 
appeasement of the Assyrians implied by the extradition of Iamani in 706 and 
opposing them militarily in 701. The former will have been the act of 
Shabatako, who died shortly afterwards, and the latter directed by his 
successor Shabako. As to why this reversal of policy took place, we have no 
objective basis for assessment. On the other hand, one might posit a mixture 
of concern at the long-term efficacy of appeasement, coupled with a 
strengthening of Egyptian-Kushite military capability following a further 
half-decade’s integration of economy and armies, which could have given 
Shabako more confidence in a positive outcome of a clash with the Assyrian 
army. 
 While this review of what we now seem to know about the Egyptian/Nubian 
end of the events of 701 thus fails to shed much additional light on what 
actually took place in Palestine, it does give some potential new insights 
into the Nilotic background. In doing so, it incidentally illustrates the 
fact that Egyptian history is far more malleable than is often appreciated 
by scholars working in adjacent regions, with “standard” reconstructions 
often obsolescent and/or incorporating far more subjective assumptions than 
may be warranted. Indeed, this factor concerning ancient history is by no 
means restricted to the Nile valley, and is but one of the factors that 
makes definitive conclusions about what happened in the past so elusive, let 
alone why. This of course makes such debates as those enshrined in Rescue 




1. Part of the lunette of one of the two stelae from Kawa in which King 
Taharqo describes (inter alia) elements of his princely career, including 
bringing an army from Kush to Egypt for King Shabatako; the scene shows 
the king and his mother, Abar, offering to Amun. Kawa V = Copenhagen, Ny 
Carlsberg Glyptotek, ÆIN 1712 (author’s photograph). 





3. Statuette of the High Priest of Amun, Horemakhet, son of Shabako; the 
text on the base names his father, Taharqo and Tanwetamani, but not 
Shabatako. From Karnak; Aswan, Nubian Museum, ex-Cairo CG 42204 = JE 
38580 (author’s photograph). 
4. The 25th Dynasty pylon of the Small Temple at Medinet Habu; its original 
texts switch directly from Shabako to Taharqo (author’s photograph). 
5. The temple of Osiris-Heqadjet at Karnak, built by Osorkon III and Takelot 
III, and extended by Shabataqo, who is depicted on the façade. The king’s 
cartouches – but not his Horus-name serekh – have been mutilated as part 
of a persecution of the memory of the Kushite kings under Psamtik II, 
which may have resulted in the loss of material relating to the events of 
701 BC in Egyptian temples (author’s photographs). 
6. Jar sealing, with one seal-impression showing Shabako smiting an enemy 
before a [lost] Egyptian god, and another showing an Assyrian before an 
Assyrian god; 4.75cm x 3.18cm. From Nineveh; British Museum WA 84884 (© 
Trustees of the British Museum). 
